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What is strategic competence and does it matter?  Exposition of 
the concept and the research agenda 
 
Abstract 
 
Drawing on a range of theoretical and empirical insights from strategic 
management and the cognitive and organizational sciences, we argue that 
strategic competence constitutes the ability of organizations and the individuals 
who operate within them to work within their cognitive limitations in such a way 
that they are able to maintain an appropriate level of responsiveness to the 
contingencies confronting them.  Using the language of the resource based view 
of the firm, we argue that this meta-level competence represents a confluence of 
individual and organizational characteristics, suitably configured to enable the 
detection of those weak signals indicative of the need for change and to act 
accordingly, thereby minimising the dangers of cognitive bias and cognitive 
inertia.  In an era of unprecedented informational burdens and instability, we 
argue that this competence is central to the longer-term survival and well being of 
the organization.  We conclude with a consideration of the major scientific 
challenges that lie ahead, if the ideas contained within this paper are to be 
validated.                    
 
Introduction 
The contexts in which modern organizations are operating and the concomitant 
demands being placed on the individuals whom work within them have changed 
dramatically over recent years.  Strategists are increasingly faced with a complex, 
ambiguous and continuously changing environment and organizational actors 
across all levels of the hierarchy, managers and non-managers alike, are having to 
absorb, process, make sense of, then disseminate a bewildering flow of 
information in order to make decisions and solve problems.  Indeed, such are the 
levels of disorder, stress and unpredictability within the contemporary workplace 
that D’Avini (1994) coined the term ‘hypercompetition’ in an attempt to 
  
  2 
characterize the typical organizational response to this state of affairs.  While 
some writers have questioned the validity of D’Avini’s thesis.  Such is the scale 
of social and technological change presently confronting organizations that the 
information processing and knowledge management capabilities required to 
manage the situation are at a premium.   The problem, however, is that “change is 
incessant and not fully describable or predictable” (Tsoukas & Sheppard, 2004, 
p.137).   In attempting to develop the organizational systems and processes and 
social practices that can best cope with this environment, a central premise of this 
article is that the resultant organizational designs, processes and practices,  are 
fundamentally incompatible with the capabilities of many of the individuals who 
must work within them.    
In addressing this issue, we argue for the existence of a meta-level strategic 
competence that integrates rationality with intuition in order to bring about the 
faster strategic reactions that are ultimately required if organizations are to 
survive these complex and turbulent times.  Our purpose is to reflect upon state of 
the art developments that are currently taking place across a number of disparate 
literatures, spanning the individual, group, and organizational levels of analysis 
with a view to identifying new theoretical insights through which we might better 
understand the competency requirements for improving working practices and 
enhancing individual and organizational effectiveness.  We maintain that the 
changes we are currently witnessing within the new workplace are placing 
potentially dysfunctional information processing burdens on key individuals and 
groups as they seek to skilfully steer the organization over the longer-term.  Our 
ultimate goal is to identify new lines of inquiry that might lead to the development 
of human resource management interventions for overcoming these difficulties. 
Pettigrew, Thomas and Whittington (2002) have argued that within the field of 
strategic management the actor and the human being have become lost among a 
welter of independent variables at the levels of the firm and the sector, with 
relatively limited attention paid to the individual and the networks they inhabit.  
We agree with their view that most executive behaviour is about living with and 
managing in issue-driven contexts.  Accordingly, as researchers we need to focus 
on the capabilities of the human actor in coping with and managing the strategic 
context, and consider carefully the implications of this for the design of 
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organizations.  In an era in which organizations are faced with unprecedented 
informational burdens and instability, our key message is that cognitive 
competence is crucial to strategic responsiveness and the organization's capacity 
to learn and renew itself.   
Against this backdrop, we define strategic competence as the ability of 
organizations (or more precisely their members) to acquire, store, recall, interpret 
and act upon information of relevance to the longer-term survival and well-being 
of the organization.  Using the language of the resource based view of the firm 
(Grant, 1996), this meta-level competence represents a confluence of individual 
and organizational characteristics, suitably configured to enable the organization 
to proactively detect those weak signals indicative of the need for change and act 
accordingly, thereby minimising the dangers of cognitive bias and cognitive 
inertia.  These signals are then selected, filtered, stored, recalled and interpreted in 
a fashion that enables particular individuals and groups to respond appropriately 
to the prevailing contingencies.   
This is not to say that organizations or individuals are merely passive processors 
of information.  On the contrary, a central skill underpinning strategic competence 
is the ability to proactively shape the thought processes of others through the 
inter-related processes of sensemaking and sense-giving (Gioia and Chittipendi, 
1991; Maitlis, 2005).  Strategic competence is thus underpinned by a mixture of 
computational processes and processes of social construction (Lant and Shapira, 
2001a, 2001b). 
Drawing on the insights of theory and research from the fields of strategic 
management, industrial and organizational psychology and sociology, social 
cognition, cognitive psychology and work on personality and individual 
differences, in this paper we shall demonstrate how our notion of strategic 
competence links processes of individual, intra-organizational and inter-
organizational learning and cognition with the demands on organizations for high 
levels of performance and creativity, underpinned by processes that enable 
knowledge to be managed effectively.  As we shall see, our analysis not only 
suggests a number of key theoretical propositions that need to be tested in follow 
up empirical work, but also the development of some potentially promising 
interventions that might foster this meta-level competence.   
  
  4 
 
Foundational Concepts at the Individual Level of Analysis 
The central defining concepts of our notion of strategic competence are taken 
from the rapidly developing trans-disciplinary field of managerial and 
organizational cognition (see for example Eden, 1992; Eden and Spender, 1998; 
Hodgkinson and Thomas, 1997; Huff, 1990; Lant and Shapira, 2001b; Meindl et 
al., 1996; Porac et al, 1989; Walsh, 1995).  Research conducted from a managerial 
and organizational cognition perspective has directly challenged the fundamental 
assumption of rationality, on which many of the dominant theoretical perspectives 
within the strategy field - such as the design school (Christensen et al., 1982), the 
planning school (Ackoff, 1983; Ansoff, 1965; Steiner, 1969) and the positioning 
school (Porter, 1980, 1985) - are to varying extents implicitly or explicitly based.   
 
Bounded rationality, mental representations and heuristic processing strategies 
The earliest work of cognitive scientists such as Broadbent (1958) demonstrated 
that individuals are characterised by a number of fundamental limitations that 
preclude the processing of information to the extent implied by rationale theories 
of strategy making.  At best, individuals can only strive to attain rationality within 
the limitations imposed by human information processing system (Simon, 1957).  
Managerial and organizational cognition researchers (e.g. Schwenk, 1984) have 
identified two principal ways in which strategists attempt to deal with the 
limitations imposed by the human information processing system. 
The first approach entails the development of simplified, mental representations 
of reality, variously referred to as 'schemata' (Bartlett, 1932), ‘cognitive maps’ 
(Tolman, 1932) and ‘mental models’ (Johnson-Laird, 1983).  Over the past 10-15 
years or so MOC researchers have used these notions, collectively known as 
‘mental representations,’ in an effort to better understand the processes of strategy 
formulation and implementation (see, e.g., Eden and Spender, 1998; Huff, 1990; 
Walsh, 1995).  For example, a growing body of research has explored the ways in 
which individuals and groups represent the competitive environments in which 
their businesses are operating (e.g. Hodgkinson and Johnson, 1994; Porac and 
Thomas, 1990, 1994; Porac et al., 1989, 1995; Osborne, Stubbart & Ramaprasad, 
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2001; Reger and Huff, 1993).  Strategists attend to only a limited subset of all the 
potentially available competitors and define their competitive territories in 
relatively narrow ways (Porac et al., 1989, 1995), with the consequent danger that 
potentially significant players might be overlooked (Zajac and Bazerman, 1991).  
Furthermore, once formed, actors' mental models of the competitive arena are 
slow to change, thus rendering individuals and the organizations to which they 
belong vulnerable to the actions of new entrants and other innovations the 
significance of which might not be realised until such time that the potential for 
adaptation has been severely eroded (Hodgkinson, 1997; Reger and Palmer, 
1996).   
The second approach entails the use of heuristic processing strategies, simplifying 
assumptions and rules of thumb that reduce the computational burdens on 
individual decision makers (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), thereby focusing 
attention on selected portions of the problem and surrounding environment (see, 
e.g., Das and Teng, 1999; Schwenk, 1984).  Although the use of heuristics 
reduces the information processing requirements on the decision maker, there are 
also significant risks involved, in that their deployment may lead to sub-optimal 
outcomes. Typical biases, each of which come to the fore during different stages 
of the decision process, include:  
• a general tendency to inappropriately bolster a hypothesis or conclusion by 
reliance on pre-existing beliefs and only seeking information that supports 
these (confirmation bias) (Nickerson, 1998);  
• decision accounts that are based on what seems like good explanations of 
conclusions rather than real insights into the decision process (plausibility 
bias) (Jonathan, Evans & Over, 1996);  
• the application of heuristics, which may be flawed for a variety of reasons, 
such as errors in probabilistic reasoning, selective perception and so forth 
(Schwenk, 1984) and consequential biases identified by behavioural decision 
research (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Das & Teng, 1999); and  
• acting in a way that runs against initial attitudes and standards (post decision 
regret) results in changing attitudes and beliefs to justify conduct and comport 
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with the new behaviour (cognitive dissonance) (Harmon-Jones & Mills, 
1999).  
Such cognitive biases in human judgment and decision making have a bearing on 
the strategic management process through restricted information search, 
generation of alternatives using beliefs to anchor or restrain judgements, and 
using analogies in the final evaluation stage of a group decision to justify their 
point of view, leading to an overestimation of the extent to which past experiences 
are applicable, partial descriptions of strategic alternatives, and the devaluation 
and dismissal of vitally important information by the group.  The deployment of 
heuristics can also result in decision-makers being over-confident in their 
decisions and can create a misdirected search for certainty and a consequent 
illusion of control (Fischhoff, 1975; Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1977; 
Langer, 1975). 
When we consider this work on mental representations and heuristics and biases 
in the context of the complex and turbulent environments in which modern 
organizations are operating, it becomes clear that at the individual level cognitive 
skills are paramount, whilst at the organizational level systems and processes that 
enable more effective social construction come to the fore.  Strategic competence 
as we have defined it represents the ability of organizations and individual 
employees to work within their cognitive and social limitations in such a way that 
they are able to maintain an appropriate level of responsiveness to the 
contingencies confronting them, minimising the dangers of cognitive bias and 
cognitive inertia highlighted above.  As we shall see, this has crucial implications 
for the design of modern organizations.  
 
Locus of control  
We have argued that organizations that develop the capability to process 
information strategically are more likely to proactively shape their own destiny, 
whereas strategically incompetent organizations are more likely to react to their 
environments.  Psychologists concerned with the analysis of personality and 
individual differences have used the term locus of control to capture a construct 
that has a bearing on this capability.  This construct reflects the beliefs of 
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individuals about who controls the key events in their lives. It refers to a 
generalised belief in the external or internal control of reinforcement (Rotter, 
1966).  Individuals with extreme external locus of control beliefs are marked by a 
strong tendency to attribute the various outcomes in their lives to luck, chance, 
and powerful others or institutions; they believe that uncontrollable forces cause 
the events in their lives.  Individuals with a tendency towards extreme internality, 
by contrast, trust their capacity to influence the environment and believe that they 
can control the events in their lives through their own efforts and skill.   
This construct has been the subject of a number of investigations within the field 
of strategic management (see, e.g., Boone, de Brabander and Hellemans, 2000; 
Boone, de Brabander and van Witteloostuijn, 1996; Miller, 1983; Miller, Kets de 
Vries and Toulouse, 1982; Miller and Toulouse, 1986).  In particular, researchers 
have analysed relationships between the locus of control beliefs of Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) and various strategic, structural and performance 
variables associated with their firms.  Inter alia, these studies have revealed 
significant correlations between CEO internality and the tendency for firms to 
engage in strategic planning (often for a period of several years hence), to seek 
information about the business environment and to lead rather than follow 
competitors.  Moreover, business organizations led by internally-oriented CEOs 
are more likely to inhabit dynamic and hostile environments, and to consult 
specialist technical staff in decision making, the structure of these organizations 
being relatively differentiated in nature (Miller, Kets de Vries and Toulouse, 1982; 
Miller, 1983; and Miller and Toulouse, 1986).   
Clearly, to the extent that locus of control beliefs are influenced by actors’ past 
experiences of success and failure to attain mastery of the business environment, 
we would expect to find that this variable has a bearing on the way in which 
actors process strategic information and represent this information in their mental 
models.  On the basis of a detailed review of the literature on top executives, 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) identified how this might occur.  Locus of 
control beliefs influence an individual’s field of vision, selective perception and 
interpretation of information in a variety of ways: for example, ‘internals’ devote 
greater effort to environmental scanning, using a wider array of sources, and 
notice and are aware of a greater proportion of the information that they scan in 
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comparison to their external counterparts.  It follows that these differences are 
likely to be reflected in the structure and content of actors’ mental models of 
strategic issues and problems, the mental models of internally-oriented individuals 
being relatively enriched in comparison to those of externally oriented 
individuals.  This hypothesis is clearly worthy of investigation in future work.  
The extent to which it is uniformly desirable for organizations to select 
individuals on the basis of internal locus of control beliefs and/or to foster such 
beliefs is another question that also requires careful investigation.  Clearly, a key 
danger associated with excessive internality is that individuals or groups might 
develop illusions of control (Fischhof, 1975; Fischhof et al., 1977; Langer, 1975; 
Willman et al., 2001).  Hence, it may be advisable to select individuals with 
intermediate internal-external control expectancies throughout the top team, or, 
indeed, the wider organization as a whole.  Alternatively, a strategy of building 
teams comprising mixed control expectancies might prove more helpful in the 
longer run.  The relative merits of these two alternative prescriptions should form 
the focus of research attention as a matter of some urgency. 
 
Dual information processing strategies 
As argued above, strategic competence requires the formation of rich cognitive 
maps.  However, herein lies a potential dilemma.  On the one hand, strategists 
need to be able access and process a considerable volume of information with 
attention to detail.  Often it is in the detail that real insights can occur that will 
prevent organizations from embarking on courses of action that are destined to 
failure from the outset and/or will enable them to recognize when hitherto 
unforeseen problems are beginning to emerge, so as to be able to take the 
necessary corrective action.  On the other hand, too much information is also 
problematic, given the limited processing capabilities of the individual manager to 
process information.  Clearly two sorts of competency are required to deal with 
this paradoxical state of affairs.  Analytical skills are needed in order to process 
detail, while a second, complementary set of skills is also required, enabling 
individuals to monitor the ‘bigger picture’, in a more holistic fashion.   
Dual processing theories in cognition stem from three sources:  
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? sense making and ‘practical intelligence’ studies concerned specifically with 
the retrieval and use of tacit knowledge (Brockmann and Anthony, 2002; Gioia 
and Ford, 1996; Hogarth, 1987; Parikh, Neubauer and Lank, 1994; Thomas, 
Clark and Gioia, 1993);  
? models of parallel systems of perception and information processing (Chaiken 
and Trope, 1999; Gilbert, 2002; Hogarth, 2001; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman 
and Frederick, 2002; Payne and Bettman, 2004; Sloman, 1996, 2002; 
Stanovich and West, 2000); and  
? personality and individual difference psychology studies of ways of gathering, 
organising, processing and evaluating information (Epstein, 1990, 1991, 1998; 
Epstein et al., 1996).   
Although these theories differ in terms of the general properties distinguished for 
each system, and the relative independence of each system, they share the view 
that two separate processes are involved in reasoning with each leading to a 
different construction of the task (Sadler-Smith and Sparrow, 2007).   The 
theories account for the ways in which processing is skilfully accomplished.  
Stanovich and West (2000) proposed the neutral labels of ‘System 1’ and ‘System 
2’ for two such contrasting processes.  System 1 has the properties of automaticity 
and heuristic processing and is associated with interactional intelligence (the 
ability to model other minds in order to read intentions and make rapid 
interactional moves).  It is “relatively unconscious, automatic, highly associative, 
rapid, contextualised, parallel, evolved early, is relatively independent of 
language, and generates feelings of certitude.  System 1 thinking is related to what 
is commonly called intuition” (Payne and Bettman, 2004, p.125).   System 2 
thinking has the properties of analytic intelligence and is characterised as 
“controllable, conscious, constrained by working memory, rule-based, serial, 
develops with age and is vulnerable to aging, is related to language, and is less 
characterised by feelings of certitude” (Payne and Bettman, 2004, p.125).   
This general distinction between controlled and automatic processing has found 
credence in the recent strategy literature, as a basis for enriching understanding of 
the information processing dilemmas confronting individuals involved in the 
strategic management process.  For instance, Reger and Palmer (1996) argued that 
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controlled and automatic processing strategies are central to an understanding of 
how cognitive inertia comes to develop in managerial assessments of competition.  
The reason that managers fail to notice significant changes in their business 
environments is due to a tendency to monitor competitors’ actions automatically, 
using extant cognitive categories.  Clearly, if managers are to survive the rigours 
of complexity and turbulence confronting them at the present time, not only must 
they develop finely honed analytical skills, but also processing strategies that 
enable them to cut through the detail in order to take action under time pressure 
with less conscious cognitive effort, thereby freeing up capacity for creativity and 
innovation.   
Dual processing theories are relevant to our discussion of strategic competence 
for two reasons: 
1. they stress the use of complimentary forms of information processing, and 
2. they attach significance to the role of affect.  
There is a growing consensus that many of the cognitive processes associated 
with intuitions have a source in, or relationship to, affect.  Recent work portrays 
intuition as an experiential phenomenon that is based upon tacit knowledge, and 
in which there is an inter-play of cognitive and affective processes (Sadler-Smith 
& Sparrow, 2007; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005). Muramatsu and Honoch (2005) 
have also argued for links between emotion and intuitive processing by 
combining ideas from evolutionary psychology and neuroscience, noting that 
whilst historically, cognition and emotions have been seen as competing 
explanations, it is now considered that: “emotions can be viewed as information-
processing systems just like memory and perception” (Muramatsu and Hanoch, 
2005, p. 209, p. 214). 
 
Individual differences in the processing of strategic information 
The ultimate skill that needs to be fostered at this juncture is be the ability to 
adapt the ways in which information is processed, switching back and forth from 
‘habits of mind to active thinking,’ as appropriate to each particular situation.  
Louis and Sutton (1991) have aptly coined the phrase ‘switching cognitive gears’ 
to characterize this vital competence, arguing that effectiveness may be as much a 
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function of an individual’s capacity to sense when such a switch is required, as to 
process information in one mode or another (see Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith, 
2003).   
How might organizations identify individuals who posses this capability and 
foster it in others?  The recent work of Epstein and his colleagues is particularly 
illuminating in this connection.  In keeping with our line of reasoning above, 
cognitive-experiential self theory (CEST) developed by Epstein and colleagues’ 
(Epstein, 1990, 1991, 1998; Epstein et al., 1996) asserts that analytic and intuitive 
processing are independent processes, each served by separate cognitive systems. 
Epstein (2000, p.671) argues that the two systems “…operate in parallel and are 
interactive”.   This is different to the System 1-2 model, which, based on 
cognitive continuum theory, sees the two processing modes as mutual opposites.    
Cognitive style 
Responses to these orthogonal scales have been shown to differentially correlate 
with a variety of measures of personality, achievement, interpersonal relations and 
emotional adjustment (Epstein et al, 1996).  It is clear from a number of studies 
using these scales and work on individual differences in the processing of 
information more generally (e.g. Allinson and Hayes, 1996; Robey and Taggart, 
1981) that this requirement for dual processing strategies notwithstanding, many 
individuals are marked by an overriding preference for one approach or the other, 
i.e. cognitive style.   
Cognitive style influences the way in which managers scan the environment for 
new information, organize and interpret this information, and incorporate their 
interpretations into the mental models and subjective theories that guide their 
actions (Hayes and Allinson, 1998).  Clearly it is an important factor underlying 
the development of strategic competence, in that those individuals who process 
information in ways that fail to recognize important changes to their situation may 
also fail to update their knowledge and skills, as required for their continuing 
effectiveness.  This failure to adapt may not only have drastic implications for 
their individual careers, but also the wider organization as a whole.    
On the basis of the above theorizing it would be useful to explore the extent to 
which and in what ways self-report instruments for the assessment of individual 
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differences in information processing styles and strategies such as the REI, the 
cognitive style index (CSI) (Allinson and Hayes, 1996) might be used as a basis 
for the selection and development of individuals and teams involved in the 
business of organizational strategizing (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2003).  In 
order to do this, however, we also need to better understand the nature of intuitive 
decision making and the extent to which the competence may be developed or 
not. 
Intuition reflects knowledge that is not expressed in words or other symbols and 
therefore must be acquired through perceptual and other non-symbolic mental 
processes (Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004).   However, this form of knowing is 
based on a number of mechanisms, each of which now needs to be better 
incorporated into theories of intuition.  Whilst intuition, incubation and insight 
share the common feature of involving unconscious processing to varying 
degrees, they are separate processes.  For Sadler-Smith and Shefy (2004), insight 
(literally “seeing” a solution) means the solution of a problem.  This might be 
seen in a non-visual sense, but the eventual solution is at a level of conscious 
understanding that enables articulation of the problem’s elements and inter-
relationships.  Not all intuitions become insights and not all insights come from 
antecedent intuitions or validating processes of incubation.  In short, intuition is 
an antecedent form of knowing, incubation is a transformation process, and 
insight is an outcome.   In reviewing the literature, Sadler-Smith and Sparrow 
(2007) argue the questions that now need to be addressed concern:  how access 
mechanisms associated with the separate processes of incubation, insight and 
intuition operate; how intuitive and pre-inventive expertise is represented in 
schemata; how attentional mechanisms operate; and what are the meta-cognitive 
monitoring techniques that enable rapid perceptual framing and responses to 
emotional memory? 
 
The distinction between insight and intuition in particular signals the need for 
social processes to surround individual competence.  We return to this later when 
we discuss the social processes necessary to enable the organizational competence 
of foresight.  However, to summarize the arguments so far, we have identified a 
major dilemma for strategists, namely, the need to process strategic information in 
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sufficient detail to attain mastery over the environment, without becoming so 
overwhelmed in the detail as to stifle the ability to respond with agility.  Two 
alternative processing strategies have been highlighted, one entailing rational 
analysis, the other involving the use of heuristics and intuition to enable managers 
to cut through the detail so as to facilitate creativity and innovation.  We have also 
identified some individual differences that likely have a major bearing on the 
ability of managers to deploy in appropriate balance these processing strategies, a 
vital prerequisite for the attainment of strategic competence at the individual 
level.  This work on individual differences thus has important implications for the 
design of personnel selection and training and development interventions.  It also 
has some highly significant implications for organizational design, to which we 
return in due course.  
 
Sensemaking and sense-giving/thought leadership as meso-level 
bridging processes  
First we turn to consider the role of sensemaking and sensegiving, vital links 
between individual and organizational level processes.   Sensemaking is the 
process whereby members of an organization confront surprising or confusing 
events, issues and actions.  It both precedes decision making and follows it, but it 
is still a relatively unexplored social process (Maitlis, 2005).  Sensegiving 
concerns the attempts of individuals to influence the outcome and communicate 
their thoughts about a change to others in order to gain their support. 
Our notion of strategic competence requires linkages between the above research 
on individual differences and research on shared cognition (which looks at 
cognition from a social constructivist perspective).  We maintain that one of the 
roles of strategic leaders is to meet this requirement, creating insights within the 
followers' own mental representations (Gioia and Chittipendi, 1991; Hellgren and 
Melin, 1993; Lindell et al., 1998; Dunford & Jones, 2000).  Rouleau (2005) has 
also argued that middle managers, through their close interface with external 
stakeholders, play a vital role in the interpretation and selling of a strategy. 
An effective vision is one that can lead to the development of shared mental 
models.  Silvester, Anderson and Patterson (1999) argued that a leader’s sharing 
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of their own cognition and the exposure to new sources of information that this 
usually involves can create learning by altering other team members' attributions 
of cause and effect influences.  As more attributions are altered towards internal 
ones (a “we can do it mentality”) this serves to increase self-efficacy among 
leaders and followers alike.  In turn, the resulting sense of agency creates a feeling 
of psychological empowerment among the team.   
An important research task that has yet to be completed is to integrate the work 
that has examined the political skills and tactics that appear to underpin the 
process of sense-giving/thought leadership at the organizational level, with the 
voluminous work on individual cognition and leadership behaviours.  In 
introducing the notion of thought leadership as a component of strategic 
competence, we do not wish to imply the endorsement of an overly simplistic top-
down view of strategizing.  On the contrary, we view sensemaking and sense-
giving as fundamentally inter-twined, multi-directional processes, pervading all 
organizational levels, strategies being the product of a negotiated order (Johnson, 
1987; Pettigrew, 1973, 1985; Maitlis, 2005).  Nonetheless, there are a number of 
interesting avenues for further research.  In particular, it would now be useful to 
know to what extent: there are fundamental differences in the ways in which such 
thought leadership is attempted (and countered) across varying organizational 
levels; the various individual differences variables discussed in the previous 
section have a bearing on this key competence; and there is any degree of linkage 
between differing approaches to leadership, or leadership style, and the way in 
which sensemaking and sense-giving are accomplished?  
  
Implications for Organizational Design 
As noted in the opening sections, organizations operate in an increasingly 
turbulent environment and this has heralded changes in the nature of work and 
organizational forms.  We have argued that to operate effectively in this new 
context individuals require the ability to operate with a balanced set of cognitive 
skills.  This has raised fundamental questions as to how they do this, but it also 
has implications for the selection and development of individuals and the design 
of organizations that they inhabit.   In the opening section we have reviewed how 
  
  15 
the field of cognitive science at the individual level has been applied to the 
strategy arena.  We now demonstrate that there are important implications for 
organization design.  Organizations cannot afford to put individuals into situations 
where they are overloaded with information but equally they do not want 
individuals who are informationally-lean.  In the following section we move to 
the next level of analysis and consider some of the prerogatives that have been 
established recently in the organization design, organizational forms and 
knowledge management literatures.   Our analysis demonstrates that we either 
have to rethink the design of organizations and the principles on which they are 
based, or alternatively we have to adapt the individuals who are placed into the 
new designs. 
We consider now in greater detail the development of strategic competence at the 
organizational level.   The organizational aspects of strategic competence outlined 
in the following sections are intertwined fundamentally with the individual 
difference factors previously discussed: clearly the possession of individual facets 
of strategic competence are only of value if supporting collective and 
organizational facets co-exist.  Structural forms and cultural characteristics at the 
organizational level both reinforce the emergence of the appropriate individual 
characteristics associated with strategic competence and enable the generation of 
effective social construction of meaning (Weick, 1995).  However, whilst 
strategists must have an initial perspective that recognises the importance of the 
following series of team and organizational level competences, they also need the 
process skills to manage others in ways that allow these higher-level competences 
to deliver their benefits.  Group dynamics can attenuate or amplify individual 
ideas, thus serving an editing role in terms of which individuals persist in voicing 
their ideas.  The skilful management of group processes is thus vital for strategic 
competence to exist.   
Strategic thought cannot be understood without also understanding action and the 
learning resulting from action.    However, we are faced with the problem that 
many of the writings on knowledge management, organizational learning and the 
learning organization have been tantamount to little more than a repackaging of 
established concepts, theories, frameworks and tools from other, better established 
areas of the management disciplines (Hodgkinson and Sparrow, 2002).   These 
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terms have to be translated into ‘actionable knowledge’ (Argyris, 1999), i.e. 
knowledge which is at one and the same time both scientifically rigourous and 
useful to practitioners.   
The learning organization is an institution that identifies, promotes and evaluates 
the quality of its learning processes, whilst organizational learning is the process 
through which individuals acquire chunks of knowledge, develop and spread this 
knowledge within the organization, gain acceptance of it, and recognize it as being 
potentially useful (Huber, 1991; Tsang, 1997).  Critics of the latter construct 
maintain it is an oxymoron because learning requires disorganization and 
increased variety whereas organizing creates the capacity to forget and leads to a 
reliance on procedures that reduce requisite variety (cf. Weick and Westly, 1996).  
We argue, however, that discarding this notion at this juncture would be 
premature. There are some important insights emerging into how principles of 
organizational learning can support current information-driven and distributed 
organizational designs.  The organizational learning field makes two sets of 
important distinctions: 
1. Explicit versus tacit knowledge and learning,   
2. Knowledge and learning that resides within the individual versus that which 
resides within collectives.  
These perspectives each emphasise the importance of different sets of 
organizational and individual competences, but also imply different routes to 
gaining these competences.   
New organizational forms – and in particular the N-form – have received 
considerable attention within the strategic management literature.  This work has 
highlighted the importance of integration mechanisms for bringing together the 
varied knowledge of small numbers of individuals to produce organizational 
solutions (Fenton and Pettigrew, 2000).  It has also indicated the need to 
understand the nature of the intra-organizational information markets that operate 
within them. The ability to control and manage the quantity and quality of 
information that flow through these markets is central to organizational survival 
(Hansen, 1999; Hansen et al, 1999; Hansen and Haas, 2001).   
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As such, the individual-level process skills of the strategist outlined in the earlier 
sections of this article are supported at the organizational level by designs based 
on principles of redundancy and overlapping business processes, internal 
competition, strategic rotation of actors, free access to information (reduced 
information differentials) and single, integrated databases.  The work on 
organizational design most relevant for our purposes has focused on three key 
phenomena, the:  
? role of integration mechanisms in the enhancement of flows of information 
across cross-unit linkages (Galbraith, 1973; Tushman, 1977);  
? facilitation of searches for knowledge that is not immediately available 
(Hansen, 1999); and  
? transfer of complex knowledge without message distortions (Zander and 
Kogut, 1995).   
The strategic importance of informational interactions that now have to be 
managed appears to be increasing markedly, following several major 
developments in information and communication technologies and fundamental 
changes to the design of organizations.   Renewed attention is therefore also being 
given the design of intra-organizational information markets within organizations 
as a source of strategic competence in which the brokering of information across 
internal and external markets is considered the major commodity traded (Van 
Wijk and van den Bosch, 2000).  
It follows from the previous discussion that this form of organization has not been 
thought through from a cognitive perspective.  We have pointed out that in order 
to be an effective broker of information, employees need appropriate mental 
models of the organization and insight into how knowledge and information needs 
to be shared across those people who need to interact.  Moreover, in information-
rich environments the scarcest resource is the attention that people can devote to 
information (Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1997).  Key nodes in the network may be at 
risk of information overload whilst nodes at the periphery may not be in tune with 
the sensemaking that exists in the core of the network.  This reinforces the 
importance of individual differences discussed above in resolving these problems.  
Second, these organizational forms tend to have a much greater reliance on teams 
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and distributed cognition.  This provides a very different context for the social 
construction of meaning and the competences needed by the individual strategist 
to foster and/or cope with this social construction.  Many organizations are likely 
to be ill equipped to meet the challenges posed by major changes in the economy 
and the wider technological environment that might soon engulf them. 
The role of strategic leaders in this context therefore is to help transform the 
social capital that resides within the tacit knowledge of the organization into more 
explicit intellectual capital.  However, their contribution is viewed in different 
ways (Whittington, 1993).  The rationalistic school considers that the strategist 
thinks on behalf of the whole organization and provides predictability through the 
setting of clear objectives and intentions and effective communication.  The 
evolutionary school, by contrast, considers strategy to be a label placed upon 
emergent behaviour.  Organizations develop a memory that captures previously 
successful strategies.  The processual school places more attention on the 
processes that strategic leaders use to creatively destroy outmoded practices and 
attitudes and then manage in order to make the organization more flexible, 
adaptable and receptive to change.  Organizations learn from mistakes, and the 
ability to learn equates to the ability of an organization to reconstruct and adapt its 
knowledge-base (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991).  We turn attention now to what is 
involved in this reconstruction of the organizational knowledge base. 
 
Foundational Concepts at the Organizational Level of Analysis 
We now explain the ways in which strategic leaders can elicit the more tacit 
aspects of strategic management.  In doing so it is important to note that tacit 
knowledge has been viewed in two different ways.  It is has been viewed as either 
knowledge that in essence is hard to access and communicate (Nonaka, 1991) but 
ultimately capable of articulation  and surfacing into an arena suitable for an 
analytical style of cognitive processing.   It has also been viewed as knowledge 
that is of a different order that lies outside the conscious and rational modes of 
cognition (Spender, 1998).  The competences needed to elicit this form of tacit 
knowledge are those based on automatic processing (see our earlier discussion of 
controlled versus automatic processing).  However, access is required to different 
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forms of memory. The reconstruction and adaptation of the organizational 
knowledge base requires that strategists inquire into implicit intelligence or tacit 
knowledge through five capabilities. Each must be mastered by strategic leaders 
and other managers involved in strategic thinking.   We centre discussion on the 
role and implications of:  
? tacit knowledge transfer;  
? the role of communities of practice and global expertise networks;  
? organizational knowledge structures and memory;  
? team cognitions and the management of distributed cognition; and 
? foresightful and high reliability organizations. 
 
Theories of action and knowledge transfer across communities. 
First we must consider how knowledge that is tacit in nature but capable of 
processing through the use of analysis can be articulated and made explicit 
through the possession of a number of processual skills that ensure effective 
group dialogue and the subsequent cognitive and behavioural change that this 
creates within the group (Leroy and Ramanantosa, 1997; Starbuck and Hedberg, 
2001).  Of these skills the competency of collective dialogue (van der Heijden and 
Eden, 1998), known too as organizational inquiry, rumour and conflict or strategic 
conversation has received considerable attention.   Top teams may face the 
challenge of developing more elaborate and thorough consensus and shared 
perceptions of reality (Ginsberg, 1990).  Viewed from this perspective, cognitions 
are considered to belong only to individual managers (Eden, 1992) and learning 
entails the construction, testing and restructuring of their theories of action.   The 
processual skills of the strategic leader improve the quality of group 
communication, thereby facilitating the exchange and testing of individual 
knowledge and theories of action and the generation of new and shared group 
insights.   Processual skills are needed to manage tacit knowledge because 
without them group dynamics will attenuate or amplify individual ideas and bring 
an editing role to what individuals persist in voicing to the world.  In order for an 
organization to possess strategic competence, such editing has to be both 
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intelligent and additive.  This editing only takes place in a managed and skilful 
environment.   
Strategic competence then involves the ability to transfer tacit knowledge between 
individuals, collectives and systems  (Brown and Duguid, 1991, Orr, 1990).  A 
convergence of ideas from the fields of educational sociology, developmental 
psychology and management and organization studies has helped us understand 
how these collective and intuitive processes work.  Ultimately, organizational 
learning is not just something that takes place within the head of individuals but is 
a political process embedded in the culture of the organization and the 
interactions, informal exchanges and knowledge transfer across the communities 
within it.   
Activity theory, derived from the work of sociologists and educationalists 
(Engestrom, 1987,1993) shows that knowledge is not a commodity that 
individuals or organizations have or acquire (a passive absorption of knowledge) 
but is better conceptualised as an ‘infrastructure of knowing’ which is generated 
through actual participation in the practice and engagement in the performance.  
Organizations define the parameters around both formal groups of learners 
associated with a particular profession and the informal, rapidly changing 
constituencies of people who might be brought together through a series of 
interactions, thereby creating ‘legitimate peripheral participation’ (Lave and 
Wenger, 1991).   
Communities of practice (CoPs) are one of the mechanisms through which 
collective knowledge can be created, held and transferred.  They have been the 
subject of much recent debate (see Handley, Sturdy, Fincham & Clark, 2006; 
Roberts, 2006).  Attention has focused on unstructured, spontaneous, self-
managing and emergent groups, and the social interactions within and without 
them, that surround learning, the ways in which meaning is negotiated and 
materialises through processes of participation and engagement, and the 
development of shared repertoires of knowledge.    Handley et al (2006) note that 
the term has been used quite loosely (although to be fair this criticism could be 
applied to the discourses that surround most all of the constructs discussed in this 
article) and that there are many other organizational forms in which collective 
goal-orientated learning activity shares characteristics of mutual engagement, 
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joint enterprize and shared repertoires, such as temporary groups or project teams 
with wide constituencies. 
Although the extent to which such processes can be managed is open to debate, 
managers (and their organizations) are assumed to be able to identify the networks 
that might constitute a community of practice at any one point of time and 
facilitate the development of such communities by encouraging the alignment of 
new practices that result (Brown & Duguid, 2001; Wenger & Synder, 2000) or by 
promoting the lateral processes and organizational forms that might assist their 
operation.  However, Roberts (2006) notes many unresolved questions and 
limitations that remain.  As with any social institution or negotiation process, the 
management of recognition and power within and without the community is 
important (Blackler & McDonald, 2000).  So too is the management of trust and 
its impact on motivations to share knowledge (Andrews & Delahage, 2000).   
Handley et al (2006) examine the situated learning that takes place in CoPs from 
the perspective of both individual learners and the socio-cultural context into 
which CoPs have to be embedded.  In reality participation may not be full but 
rather consist of many forms of marginal identification (be that in terms of formal 
activity or inside the minds of participants).   
For Roberts (2006), the size that CoPs may take requires an understanding of the 
issue of critical mass and how such communities, in isolation, or as part of wider 
“constellations of practice”, lead to the formal codification of knowledge and the 
development of centres of excellence (Sparrow, 2005).  A centre of excellence is 
an organizational unit that embodies a set of organizational capabilities. note that 
are explicitly recognised as an important source of value creation (Frost, 
Birkinshaw & Prescott, 2000).  There needs also to be a strategic remit, such as 
the intention to leverage or disseminate these capabilities to other parts of the 
firm. 
Social constructionists point to the need for organizations to have cultures, 
structures and systems that enable the acquisition of learning through: team 
processes of learning, reflection and appreciative enquiry; co-inquiry, as opposed 
to expert-student relationships; joint planning forums; long time-span projects; 
and dialogues across communities.   Lindkvist (2005) noted that there are many 
current business pressures inside organizations that make the operation of CoPs 
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either inappropriate (pressures of speed and cost) or more likely pursued in lip-
service only.  Hodgkinson and Sparrow (2002) argue that the operation of CoPs is 
also highly dependent on the skills of participants and the extent to which 
managers and other key actors possess the requisite skills listed above is highly 
questionable. CoPs involve multiparty negotiations and therefore conflicts.  A 
number of social processes influence the degree of sensemaking within such 
negotiations (Maitlis, 2005).   For Maitlis (2005), a number of social processes 
affect the level of animation and control in sensemaking processes, including: 
leadership influence and the competence of sensegiving (discussed earlier); 
strategies of political influence and upwards issue-selling; the social roles of 
actors; and the degree to which there is collective mind and heedful interactions.  
Attention has also been given to feedback and upward communication 
mechanisms (Tourish & Robson, 2006).  The relationship between power and 
transmission of critical upwards communication and the existence of a series of 
factors that engender a communications climate are important.  We should 
therefore add a number of other social processes shown to be important in any 
exchange relationship become important to Maitlis’s list, such as identification, 
internalisation, commitment and attachment, ownership, and perceived support.   
Strategic competence therefore requires: 
? the introduction of practices that govern the legitimate peripheral participation 
within a business process or work practice in ways that allow communities to 
understand their own trajectories (where did we come from, where are we 
now, where do we want to go next and how do we get their?) and learn 
through the development of their own identities, professions and skills 
(Elkjaer, 1999).    
? the introduction of organizational forms (such as centres of excellence) that 
can create sufficient critical mass inside organizations to influence the conduct 
of strategy. 
? specific abilities of participants, and surrounding organizational practices, to 
engender necessary processes of social construction inside CoPs and similar 
organizational forms.   
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Moreover, little is understood about how the unconscious modes of thought and 
cognitive biases discussed at the beginning of this article impact the influence that 
power and trust have on the operation of such communities, or the resultant levels 
of foresight.  We still need to explain how such communities may change and 
innovate (Fox, 2000).  Our previous discussion of the cognitive processes 
associated with intuition and dual processing has relevance to this question. 
 
Decoding organizational level knowledge structures   
The discussion of shared repertoires of knowledge in the previous section 
assumes that such knowledge is decipherable.  Clearly, many of the cognitions 
and theories of action that must be made more explicit may not just reflect 
individual cognitions but in fact reflect this more collective sense of knowing.  
We must also therefore consider a second issue, which is how the internalisation 
of knowledge within organizational institutions and organizational memory, 
though its representation of knowledge that is tacit in nature, is considered in the 
literature as being capable of analytical processing.  Linking back to our earlier 
discussion of individual level factors, organizational memory serves to reinforce 
elaborative rather than automatic, heuristic processing, producing greater 
sensitivity to past history and political influences, and increases the richness of 
the strategist’s cognitive maps.   For example, Lyles and Schwenk (1992) argued 
that the worldviews of senior managers become encoded, stored and retrieved in 
the organization’s knowledge structures (the shared beliefs that define the 
expected relationships, behaviours and actions of the organization’s members).  
This includes: cultural language, symbols, stories, sagas; the transformation logics 
implicit in the standard operating procedures; the organizational structure and 
roles allocated to people; and the physical structure of the environment (Walsh 
and Ungson, 1992).  Protagonists argue that if decoded, such organizational 
memory is a strategic competence because it avoids repetition of past mistakes, 
adds legitimacy to new decisions, draws on history to frame sharper questions, 
and helps control and co-ordinate implementation (Sparrow, 1994).  These send 
‘higher-order reference signals’ to managers that serve to guide their behaviour 
(Weick, 1979), as do external archives (former employees, competitors, business 
historians and archival sources).  Modular forms of organization that inter-
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connect and co-ordinate self-organizing business processes (Daft and Lewin, 
1993) and distributed knowledge systems (Tsoukas, 1996) have also been 
forwarded as vehicles to achieve this institutionalisation of tacit knowledge.  
There are then multiple ways of knowing within organizations and organizational 
knowledge resides not only within the minds of individuals but also within 
collectives and within organizational artefacts.  The strategic management process 
has to be aligned with the knowledge flows to and from individuals that arise 
from deeper institutional structures.  In examining how individuals interact with 
knowledge-embedded artefacts that surround them, it is evident that strategists 
have to both individually attend, and ensure collective decoding of, this 
institutionalised tacit knowledge.     
 
Team cognitions  
However, such decoding is not sufficient.  It is becoming widely accepted that 
organizations have shifted more to team-based work structures that require 
interdependence of goals and performance (Salas, Dickenson, Converse & 
Tannenbaum, 1992; Kozlowski & Bell, 2003).  Strategists therefore must also 
understand how shared cognition within teams may reside not within individuals 
taken in isolation, nor just within institutions and organizational memory artefacts 
outside them, but also within the interactions between the activities of group 
members (Gibson, 2001).  Shared cognition is an important indicator of a team’s 
readiness or preparedness to take on a strategic task.  It ensures that the process of 
performance and the necessary interaction between team members is understood.  
Cues have to be interpreted similarly and decisions must be compatible in order 
for there to be greater accuracy, efficiency and quality of output, more accurate 
predictions of group performance, and greater levels of cohesion and trust (Cooke 
at al, 2000).  
We can be guided here both by work undertaken by human factors experts on the 
nature of team mental models and work on upper echelons theory as applied to 
consensus of executive beliefs in top teams.  Team mental models represent an 
emerging cognitive state that vary in terms of accuracy and levels of similarity to 
other team members’ maps (Ilgen, Hollenbeck. Johnson and Jundt, 2005) but 
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team members need accurate and similar representations for their teams to be 
effective (Marks, Sabella, Burke and Zaccaro, 2002; Smith-Jentsch, Campbell, 
Milanovich and Reynolds, 2001).  Hodgkinson and Sparrow (2002) argue that 
strategic competence therefore must entail management of both what has to be 
shared between teams (i.e. insight into what is task-specific knowledge, task-
related knowledge, knowledge of team-mates, and attitudes and beliefs) and the 
nature of this sharing (i.e. understanding of whether knowledge has to be shared 
or overlapping, similar or identical, complimentary or compatible, or distributed) 
(Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 2001).  Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas and 
Cannon-Bowers (2000) drew attention to the importance of effective team 
interaction mental models (which serve to integrate perceptions about collective 
interdependence).  More is needed, however, beyond such collective 
understanding of a team’s resources, goals and performance strategies.   A range 
of work has drawn attention to the additional competences that are central to 
effective distributed cognition or team cognition systems.   
The first competence is information sampling or pooling behaviours (Stasser et al, 
1995) whereby group behaviour under the unmediated influence of leadership, 
expertise and status leads to dysfunctional information sampling, initial 
gravitation to favoured shared cognitions and limitations in the way that 
knowledge is organized and inter-connected by individuals.  The earlier 
discussion of the necessary skills to create true dialogue across communities of 
practice is an important mediator in this regard.  The impact of diversity on team 
use of information (range, depth and integration) has formed the basis of recent 
study (Dahlin, Weingart and Hinds, 2005).  The second competence is cognitive 
consensus (Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994; Knight et al, 1999; Sutcliffe and 
Huber, 1994) whereby strategic consensus is reached via the mediation of group 
processes that shape the wider decisional arena through policy capturing, 
agreement seeking, risk judgement, and conflict management strategies.  The 
third competence is transactive memory (Hinsz, Tindale and Vollrath, 1997; 
Moreland, 2000; Wegner, 1987). This has been defined as a cooperative division 
of labour for learning, remembering and communicating relevant team knowledge 
(Wegner, 1987).   
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Ellis (2006, p. 580) notes that “… team interaction mental models and transactive 
memory are conceptually and empirically distinct constructs”.  Different parts of 
the organization may gain insight into where to acquire knowledge, not just 
through the development of common, shared and overlapping knowledge based 
on processes of convergence, similarity and agreement, but instead through the 
development of complimentarity, predictability and compensation based on 
insight into distributed and differentiated capabilities. From an information 
processing perspective, Ilgen et al (2005) consider that levels of specialisation 
(memory differentiation), co-ordination (ability to work together effectively) and 
credibility (team members’ beliefs about the reliability of other team members) 
represent the emergent cognitive manifestations of transactive memory.  From a 
social psychology perspective, Hollingshead (1998a, 1998b) focuses on directory 
updating (learning who knows what), information allocation (information 
communication to experts) and retrieval co-ordination (requests for information 
known to be within a teammates’ expertise) behaviours.  Transactive memory has 
been measured and studied in a number of team performance settings recently 
(Austin, 2003; Ellis, 2006; Lewis, 2003) and along with team interaction mental 
models has been show to usefully mediate the impact that stress has on team 
performance (Ellis, 2006). 
 
Foresight and high reliability organizations 
Finally, we must explain how team-level cognition is more than just the result of 
there being a shared understanding of overlapping (common) and distributed 
knowledge residing in individual minds, but may also be considered to comprise 
the creation a collective mind.  This understanding can not only be gleaned by 
paying close attention to the communication processes that have to take place 
between a group’s members, but may also be studied mainly through the 
examination of the notion of foresight (Tsoukas & Sheppard, 2004) and how 
organizations act as high reliability systems (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 
1999).    
Contemporary discussion of notions of sensemaking, double-loop learning and 
scenario planning all allude to the notion of foresight.  Foresight is a broader 
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notion than forecasting.  It is defined as the ability to see through apparent 
confusion to spot developments before they become trends, to see patterns before 
they fully emerge, and to grasp relevant features that shape the direction of future 
events (Tsoukas & Sheppard, 2004).  Foresight is in turn the product of preceding 
insight.  It can therefore be seen as both as an individual competency (see our 
earlier discussion of insight and intuition at the individual level) but also as a 
collective quality or socially-embedded organizational capability – a background 
skill.  In this latter context organizations need systems, processes, social practices 
and cultures that sustain the capability.  In short, an organization full of intuitive 
and insightful managers would be but nothing without the capabilities discussed 
in the following sections. 
The organizational capability of foresight engenders actions that provide the 
organization with a memory of past relevance, focus of attention on the present, 
but expectation of the need for future adjustment and coping, what Tsoukas and 
Sheppard (2004, p.140) refer to as “memories of the future”  and “thinking in time 
streams”.  They cite the work of Neustadt and May (1986) who consider that with 
regard to foresightful policy decision making, there are three elements to this 
organizational capability: recognising that the future has no place to come from 
but the past; that what matters for the future in the present is departures from the 
past that affect predictive values; and a continuous comparison  and constant 
oscillation from present to future to past and back that is “heedful” of prospective 
change.  It is that latter element of heedfulness that links work on foresight to 
other concepts, notably that of high performance organizations. 
High reliability theory (Weick, 1987; Roberts, 1990) argues that organizational 
forms must be designed to allow variation in the activity being carried out, but 
stability in the cognitive processes (or cognitive architecture) that makes sense of 
this activity. Organizations concerned with reliability enact collective mental 
processes that are more fully developed than those that are only concerned with 
efficiency.  Instead of arguing that organizations have to have a shared mental 
model and a complete understanding of the world that is shared, the message is 
that organizations can be designed in such a way that very little may need to be in 
common, but what must happen is that the necessary co-ordinating mechanisms 
  
  28 
must be in place.  The fact that they are successful in achieving this is evident by 
the minimal number of disasters that occur in the world.   
This kind of theorising is more in line with Tsoukas’s (2003) criticism that the 
management studies field has misrepresented tacit knowledge and his assertion 
that tacit knowledge cannot be captured, translated or converted, but may be 
displayed and manifested in what we do, high reliability theory does however 
suggest that tacit knowledge is at least analysable and can be synthesised in ways 
that belie the constraints of the organization’s design.  We can better understand 
knowledge creation processes through the study of culture (Roberts, 1989,1990; 
Weick, 1987).  Returning briefly to the opening discussion of hyper-competition, 
researchers in the high reliability theory area argue that by analysis of high 
reliability organizations we can construct, discover and correct unexpected events 
that are capable of escalating into serious problems and establish what is 
necessary for both reliable performance and adaptive learning (D’Aveni, 1994).   
Ericksen and Dyer (2004) have examined the links between high reliability 
organization and strategic HRM systems. 
Work in the area is premised on the observation that “reliable systems are smart 
systems” (Weick and Roberts, 1993, p.260).   Organizations, and the strategists 
who provide guidance to them, can foster fully developed mental processes 
through greater reliance on controlled information processing (Schneider and 
Shiffrin, 1977), mindful attention (Langer, 1989) and heedful action (Ryle, 1949).  
For example, Weick et al (1999) adapted Langer’s (1989) concept of 
“mindfulness” (an enriched awareness concerned with the conservation of 
attention, interpretation of weak signals, differentiation of wisdom, and reframing 
of understanding that is induced by there being concern for the potential of 
catastrophe) to capture these stable underlying cognitive processes and 
architecture. High reliability theory therefore agues that the strategic management 
field can move beyond the analysis of standardized routines towards the study of 
a collective competence.  Whilst organizations do not have the ability to think or 
cognize for themselves, their requirement for the ability to handle unforeseen 
situations in ways that actually forestall unintended consequences evidences the 
contribution provided by the construction of a stable cognitive infrastructure that 
encapsulates tacit knowledge.   When individuals take heed they act carefully, 
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critically, consistently, purposefully, attentively, studiously, vigilantly and 
conscientiously.  It is the application of these adverbs to the social interactions 
that take place between individuals that creates the competence of collective 
mindfulness.  Social interactions managed in this way contribute to the mutual 
construction of the activity, help the collectivity to represent and envisage 
necessary activity, and then interrelate this activity to the system that they work 
within.  It relies on generative learning strategies that foster the creation of new 
ways of understanding a situation through the capability to see the systems and 
circular influences that control events (Senge, 1992).  Strategists therefore have to 
avoid letting the interactions within their organizations become institutionalized, 
routine and habitual, and ensure that risk-taking and learning behaviour is not 
constrained by the cognitive inertia associated with cultural problems such as 
deviance normalisation, as seen in various disasters (Starbuck and Hedberg, 
2001). 
 
Future Research Directions 
Either we need to modify the organizational forms or we have to work with the 
individuals who work within them.   In this article we have outlined the notion of 
strategic competence, defined as the ability of individuals (and collectives through 
the use of external artefacts) to successfully acquire, store, recall and interpret 
strategic information, thereby converting such information into strategic 
knowledge.   Clearly there is need for more scientific work if our vision for the 
longer-term development of organizations utilising our notion of strategic 
competence is to be realised.  We conclude by mapping out some of the principal 
research challenges that lie ahead.   There are three pressing concerns that need to 
be addressed in future research in respect of the wide-range of individual-level 
factors that have a major bearing on the attainment of strategic competence, the 
need to: 
• Clarify the conceptual nature of these individual-level factors, and to refine 
the measurement techniques currently in use as a basis for operationalising 
them. 
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• Understand how central elements, such as dual forms of processing, interact 
with each other 
• Demonstrate empirical linkages between these factors and the structure and 
content of individual’s mental representations of strategic issues and 
problems. 
Sadly, many of the individual-level constructs that we have identified as 
potentially important factors in the attainment of strategic competence are beset 
by problems of conceptualisation and measurement.  For example, in the case of 
the locus of control construct, strategic management researchers are divided as to 
whether this construct is more appropriately assessed using the well-known Rotter 
(1966) I-E Scale or domain specific scales designed specifically for use in 
organizational research (see, e.g. Boone and De Brabander, 1993; Hodgkinson, 
1992, 1993; Littunen and Storhammar, 2000).  As observed earlier, the cognitive 
style construct has similarly been the subject of theoretical and psychometric 
controversy. 
If research on the psychology of strategic management is to progress beyond 
present levels we must ultimately develop the capability to disentangle the myriad 
of potential cause and effect relationships that have a bearing on the strategic 
management process.  Nowhere is this more apparent than in respect of the mass 
of research that has been concerned with actors' mental representations of 
competitive industry structures and the analysis of cognitive processes in top 
management teams. Despite the widespread popularity of the many available 
cognitive mapping techniques such as those outlined in Huff (1990), Fiol and 
Huff (1992) as a basis for eliciting and representing strategists' conceptions of 
strategic issues and problems scant attention has been given to ascertaining the 
reliability and validity of these procedures (Hodgkinson, 2001).  Clearly this 
needs to be rectified if our understanding of strategic competence is to progress 
beyond present levels.  Furthermore, as we have seen, it is now possible to 
delineate many forms of strategic knowledge, some being amenable to 
investigation through such direct methods of elicitation, the majority of which are 
not.  Current methods of assessment are only scratching the surface, not getting at 
'deep cognition' within organizations.  In parallel to developments in this area, 
investigation in the future will also need to ascertain the degree of linkage 
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between the various relevant individual differences variables that we identify in 
the first part of the paper and the structure and content of actors’ mental 
representations of strategic issues and problems.   Future work also needs to give 
far greater prominence to the nature and significance of affective variables in the 
strategy process.  In particular, as noted by Daniels (1998, 1999) the recent 
upsurge of interest in cognitive processes in strategic management has neglected 
to consider the potential impact of emotions on strategic cognition.   
As the field moves beyond the analysis of individual-level knowledge structures, 
and more attempts are made to decode collective knowledge within and between 
organizational institutions, we shall be presented with a striking set of challenges, 
both in research terms and from a practitioner point of view.  Organizations face 
significant hurdles in attempting to create sufficient levels of knowledge 
convergence or cognitive consensus and we need to better understand the 
processes at work.  Attempting to uncover the ways in which individual, 
collective and system-embedded behaviours and characteristics impact on 
knowledge convergence and cognitive consensus will become a key pursuit.  A 
major unresolved theoretical and empirical issue, however, is the extent to which 
such consensus or convergence is necessary or desirable, as exemplified by recent 
debates in the top management team literature (see, e.g. Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996; Hodgkinson, 2001a, 2001b). 
Alternative mechanisms for the transfer of tacit knowledge above and beyond 
individual-to-individual interaction and exposure are now being sought.  Indeed, 
researchers appear to have under-estimated the role of distributed knowledge and 
we now urgently need to understand the impact that different knowledge 
management strategies and systems are having on the development of strategic 
competence.  In some cases there may be a fundamental mismatch in terms of the 
requirements imposed by the new working practices we have highlighted, 
involving decentralised and distributed decision-making and new patterns of 
communication, and the level of readiness and individual competence on the part 
of the members of “the wider team” to accept the increased responsibilities 
associated with these practices 
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CONCLUSIONS 
We have argued that the literatures on organization design and form and 
knowledge management have not considered sufficiently the parallel 
developments outlined above within the field of management cognition and 
cognitive psychology.  Indeed, much of the emerging literature connecting 
strategy and organization is psychologically naïve.  It is evident that the nature of 
the competence needed for managers to operate effectively within the new forms 
of organization now emerging is of a qualitatively different order to that typically 
selected for and developed within extant managerial populations.   If firms do not 
select and develop the requisite competences, then no matter how elegant their 
organization designs, they will not deliver the anticipated benefits.  There are 
clear parallels here to the historical debates around socio-technical systems and 
man-machine interfaces.  The benefits of a technology are not realised if the 
system operator finds ways of by-passing, or messing up, the system.   
An important academic message from the paper is that it is evident that there are 
many strategic issues currently facing modern organizations that have been under-
addressed in general, and particularly by industrial, work and organizational 
psychologists, such new forms of work organization; the virtualisation of 
organization design and work processes; and the changing boundaries between 
organizations, their customers and suppliers. Much of the current thinking in 
respect of these issues and problems has been shaped by work from fields such as 
organizational sociology and economics.  There is now a real opportunity for 
more inter-disciplinary work in these areas to enrich our understanding of these 
vital topics.  As our psychological insight into the process of strategic 
management continues to mature, we shall likely see its knowledge base and 
methods being applied to, and used to cross-inform, other emerging fields of 
study.   Hopefully, the strategic competence notion outlined in this paper will help 
to facilitate such a dialogue. 
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